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Abstract
We provide a synthesized introduction to recent findings in the link between corporate 
social responsibility and firm value. The focus is on how and why profit-maximizing 
firms engage in socially responsible actions, and how such activities can increase prod-
uct demand and shareholder value. Recent studies in empirical evidences, theoretical 
models, and trends in practice are discussed. This chapter is not intended to be a com-
prehensive survey but rather an introduction to bring future research interest in this 
field. Empirical studies show evidences of a positive impact of corporate giving on indi-
cators of firm value such as shareholder value and financial performance. Theoretical 
models provide mechanisms and economic foundations for the demand increase leading 
to profits in different market structures. Socially responsible actions can be induced by 
external activists for fear of boycotts. Investors may prefer to hold shares of responsible 
firms when corporate giving can substitute for personal giving. A public good may be 
produced jointly with a private good. Models of general industry equilibrium find that 
demand increases due to the public good may come from the endogenous market effect. 
Companies in industries with entry barriers make the top list of corporate giving. Using 
examples in the pharmaceutical, finance, and high-tech industries, we discuss how cor-
porate social responsibility is conducted in practice.
Keywords: corporate social responsibility, public good, firm value
1. Introduction
Business corporations contribute significant amounts to the public. Giving USA reported that 
total giving by corporations in 2016 is $18.55 billion. The Committee Encouraging Corporate 
Philanthropy (CECP, 2017) report that the median total giving by a corporation increased 
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from $20.7 to $21.2 million between 2014 and 2016 among 209 companies surveyed [1]. The 
median of total giving as a percentage of revenue and that as a percentage of pre-tax profit also 
increased in this period, despite decreases in total revenue and profits. These contributions 
are directed to diverse programs that are not relevant to production. For example, they are 
donated to health and social services, education, environment, disaster relief, and so on. Why 
would corporations contribute to consumption of public goods from which only consumers 
receive direct benefits? Corporate responsibility is defined as “actions that appear to further 
some social good, beyond the interest of the firm and what is required by law,” or alternatively, 
“actions which reduce the extent of externalized social costs” [2, 3]. Why would a profit-maxi-
mizing firm be interested in social corporate responsibility by making charitable contributions?
This is a first survey on the link between corporate social responsibility and firm value. We 
focus on how and why companies engage in responsible activities and how such activities 
can increase product demand and shareholder value. The plan of this chapter is to focus on 
recent developments. In the following three sections, we discuss recent findings in empirical 
evidences, theoretical models, and trends in practice. It is not intended to be a comprehensive 
survey of the literature. With this survey, we introduce this growing literature to the audience 
and hope to bring more research attention to bridging the fields of business strategy and the 
provision of the public good. We discuss empirical studies that confirm positive impacts of 
corporate social responsibility on indicators of firm value. Theoretical models provide pos-
sible mechanisms and economic foundations of why socially responsible actions can increase 
demand in different market structures. Responsible actions can be induced by external activ-
ists for fear of boycotts. Investors may prefer to hold shares of responsible firms when corpo-
rate giving can substitute for personal giving. A public good may be produced jointly with a 
private good. Models of general industry equilibrium find that demand increase due to the 
public good may come from the endogenous market effects. Companies in industries with 
entry barriers, such as health care, banking and finance, and high technology, are among top 
charitable givers. We discuss how corporate social responsibility is conducted in practice with 
companies in these industries as examples.
Studies on charitable contributions found considerable evidence that corporate social respon-
sibility has a positive impact on shareholders. Some have suggested that low contribution 
levels of corporate social responsibility can improve a firm’s value [4], yet too much corporate 
contributions can pull down shareholder wealth [5]. Most academic research has found that 
companies that are engaged in corporate social responsibility experience greater stock returns 
[6, 7] due to establishing greater trust among its employees, customers, and shareholders. The 
benefits from corporate social responsibility are especially prevalent during times of finan-
cial market uncertainty. Investors appear to reward companies that have a history of mak-
ing charitable contributions with higher stock returns during the financial market crisis of 
2008–2009 with between 4 and 7 percentage point returns to companies that exhibited higher 
corporate social responsibility intensity [8].
Theoretical investigations into corporate social responsibility explore mainly the fact that 
consumer demand for products increases with the public good. Empirical and experimental 
evidence on behavior beyond surveys confirm that consumers are willing to pay more for 
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products associated with charity or environmental friendliness [9]. Sample data from eBay 
auction show that the winning prices for items linked to charitable donations through eBay 
Giving are higher than those matched items not linked to donations. And this charity pre-
mium decreases with item value [10]. Companies market products with environmental label-
ing, which is a signal hard to verify by consumers. Experimental studies of laboratory markets 
show that such signaling of a product increases the product’s trade volume even when buyers 
are subject to various forms of incomplete information [11]. Green products can sell at sig-
nificant premiums. For example, customers of Patagonia, an outdoor sportswear brand, are 
willing to pay significant premiums for organic cotton garments [12].
This demand shift induces corporate giving in the environment of imperfect competition. 
External activists may initiate boycotts successfully when a firm does not conform to respon-
sible standards. Fearing a profit loss from boycotts, the firm will behave responsibly [13]. 
Consumers may choose joint production of the product and public good over producing sepa-
rately when the former has a cost advantage [14]. Yet, corporate giving may result in the same 
equilibrium outcome as individual voluntary contribution [15]. Giving can be an outcome of 
oligopolistic competition [16]. When investors can choose a portfolio composed of shares of 
responsible firms and regular firms, those with a higher substitution parameter for corporate 
giving will buy shares of the responsible firm, and those with a lower parameter would pre-
fer personal giving [17, 18]. The above approaches suffer various degrees of limitations. For 
example, the warm glow effect is an extra assumption that appeals to personal emotions of 
giving in addition to public consumption. Portfolio choice models assume fixed profits or 
arbitrary profit functions, which are not based on market foundations. Recently, models of 
general industry equilibrium were proposed. The incentive for corporate giving is embedded 
in the properties of market demand. Consumer loyalty brought by socially responsible actions 
results in a lower elasticity of demand. This can help a firm to lower the risk in profit stream 
and induce a premium to its product price [19]. Some private products are complementary to 
the public good. Stronger complementarity induces higher corporate giving [20].
A few practical reasons cause companies to engage in responsible activities. First, the tax 
code provides incentives for companies to make charitable contributions as doing so lowers 
their taxable income. Second, making charitable contributions improves the corporate image. 
Third, these contributions support the communities in which their employees live making the 
community a better place to live. Fourth, corporate giving garners respect from the employ-
ees. Moreover, these contributions also serve to increase the popularity of the business which 
may increase consumer loyalty to the company. Fifth, companies involved with social cor-
porate philanthropy receive valuable advertising and marketing from media exposure and 
positive public attention/recognition.
Given the reasons mentioned above for charitable contributions, which companies are more 
likely to be involved in corporate social responsibility? We expect that companies which are 
currently profitable have a greater incentive to provide contributions to social causes. In addi-
tion, it may also prove easier to make contributions when a company is profitable than when 
a company is losing money. The more competitive the industry, the less likely a company is to 
be profitable which reduces the likelihood of the corporation making charitable contributions. 
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Companies that are not profitable, have no excess profits to share with society in the public 
good provision. Hence, we expect to find more sustainable corporate giving in monopolisti-
cally competitive markets where an existing barrier to entry may allow companies to earn 
profits which can be shared with society. There are explanations such as tax incentives which 
provide incentives for companies to make charitable contributions as doing so lowers their 
taxable income. The highest US corporate tax rate is 35% and when combined with state and 
local taxes, the actual corporate tax rate is closer to 39%. Hence, for every $1 contributed to 
charitable causes, the company can save about 39 cents in lower tax payments. We note that 
in December 2017, the Tax Cut bill reduced the corporate tax rate to 20%.
Beyond tax incentives, we also expect to find companies that are attempting to either improve 
on their public image or maintain their public image will seek to make charitable contribu-
tions and conducting social corporate responsibility seriously. For example, tobacco compa-
nies may feel compelled to be a good community citizen. Pharmaceutical companies with 
blockbuster drugs which generate large corporate profits may also be seeking to improve 
their corporate image by contributing to social causes. Companies that have recently expe-
rienced a public black eye (e.g., United Airlines received lots of negative media attention for 
forcing a passenger off a plane) may also be seeking to improve their public image by provid-
ing contributions to social causes.
2. Empirical evidence
Prior work in the academic literature on corporate social responsibility and its impact on 
shareholders has found that idiosyncratic volatility (the portion of companies’ stock returns 
that are not explained by the stock market) is positively correlated with aggregate corporate 
social responsibility. In addition, some researchers believe that corporate social responsibility 
reduces flexibility to the company in responding to productive shocks and as a result earnings 
become less predictable hence the rise in idiosyncratic volatility [21].
How does corporate social responsibility impact shareholders? There is a debate in the lit-
erature about this issue as some researchers find at low contribution levels corporate social 
responsibility has a positive impact on firm value, while this relationship turns negative at 
high levels of corporate social responsibility expenditures [4]. This initially positive and then 
negative shaped relationship between corporate social responsibility suggests an optimal 
level of corporate social responsibility, a result documented by Gillan et al. [5].
On the other hand, there is considerable evidence that companies which take a more active 
role in corporate social responsibility experience higher stock returns by establishing greater 
trust among employees, customers, and shareholders. While some may question giving a 
portion of companies profits to charitable causes, these investments provide considerable 
benefits especially during financial crises. There are numerous studies that have documented 
the positive benefits from increased social corporate philanthropy. We will highlight a few of 
those now. Developing a valuation model, prior work finds through model simulation a posi-
tive relationship between firm valuation and corporate responsibility. The authors attribute 
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the higher firm valuation to a firm’s commitment to social responsibility contributions which 
can increase the firm’s probability of survival, improvement in a firm’s intermediate and long-
run cash flows, and reduce its cost of capital [6]. In addition, the authors also cite a more loyal 
customer base, more dedicated and committed employees, less likelihood of confrontations 
with labor unions, consumer advocacy groups or governmental agencies as reasons for higher 
probability of survival and lower cost of capital.
Others have also found a positive relationship between shareholder value and corporate social 
responsibility. Using an instrumental variable approach as an identification strategy, they show 
that firms that are managed effectively have fewer agency concerns (e.g., protection for minori-
ties, strong pay-for-performance incentives, and less cash abundance) are more likely to par-
ticipate in corporate social responsibility. These results run counter to the belief that corporate 
social responsibility contributions are a waste of company resources. Hence, the conclusion 
that corporate social responsibility can be consistent with maximizing shareholder wealth [7].
Other approaches include examining corporate social responsibility in the areas of environ-
ment, social, and governance (ESG) sustainability to determine whether investors (short sell-
ers) take into consideration a companies’ ESG [22]. They find lower valuations, worse future 
financial performance, lower return on equity and return on assets for firms that have low 
composite ESG scores. They also find a negative relationship between short selling and ESG 
composite scores. Hence, their findings suggest that investors (short sellers) are aware and 
take into consideration corporate social responsibility when making investment decisions.
More research has found evidence that corporate social responsibility is positively linked 
with higher firm value [23, 24]. This research has found that corporate social responsibil-
ity policies are similar for companies that are located close to one another (within the same 
3-digit zip code) [23]. Examining CEO power (as measured by CEO pay slice, CEO tenure, 
and CEO duality), prior work has found CEO power to be negatively correlated with a firm’s 
participation in corporate social responsibility [24].
Examining stock returns during the 2008–2009 financial crisis, research has found that com-
panies with higher corporate social responsibility intensity had between 4 and 7 percentage 
points higher stock returns compared to firms that had low social capital [24]. These results 
highlight the importance of firms establishing trust through engaging in corporate social 
responsibility. Companies are rewarded for these social capital investments in times when 
financial markets experience negative shocks.
Other researchers have found higher average stock returns for both US and European compa-
nies between 2003 and 2006 for firms that have great corporate social responsibility [25]. They 
find that the stock returns are larger for the US companies compared to their European coun-
terparts. The robustness of their results that corporate social responsibility holds for com-
panies in both continents lends strength to its importance. When examining large European 
companies’ finances between 2009 and 2014, further evidence that corporate social responsi-
bility matters in Europe is provided as companies with more efficient investors have higher 
corporate social responsibility. These results also suggest that corporate social responsibility 
helps firms address both agency problems and information asymmetry problems [26].




The classical libertarian free-market viewpoint sees that firms should not engage in charitable 
work with stockholders’ money and should leave public goods to the public sector. Even if 
investors have the option of contributing to the public good via corporate giving in addition to 
their personal giving, the private channel is more efficient. Moreover, in a perfectly competitive 
environment, there is no room for charity which reduces profits. This is a well-known argument 
by Friedman [27]. What lies under the classical viewpoint are the assumptions of perfect com-
petition and that consumer demand for products is independent of the public good. Friedman’s 
viewpoint prevails under these conditions, and there is an ideal separation between the private 
and the public sectors. If firms, however, do benefit from acts of charity, in the form of increased 
sales, profits and share price, assumptions for a perfectly competition market must not hold.
Therefore, to incorporate corporate social responsibility into profit-maximizing behavior, 
there need to be demand increases for firms’ products associated with more public good. 
Moreover, firms operate in a variety of imperfectly competitive market structures. A success-
ful model of corporate social responsibility needs to incorporate imperfect competition and 
demand shifts by the public good. The literature takes on a few different modeling strategies. 
We discuss these strands of models comparing the differences in their market structure, pro-
duction technologies, and components of consumer utility, and how these increase the value 
of a firm. Firms may engage in socially responsible actions due to external pressure from 
activists for the fear of boycotts, or responding to incentives internal to the market. Socially 
responsible actions can take the form of donations to the public, joint production of the pub-
lic good with products, or a better quality of products. The decision of engaging in socially 
responsible products may be made by managers in the firm, by investor through holding 
shares, or by consumers purchasing the products.
Some results in the literature may be driven by modeling features. Consumers consume and firms 
produce indivisible products; competing firms produce identical products, or the public good is 
jointly produced with a private product at a fixed ratio. Firms’ roles are suppressed; either they 
are not making production decisions or their actions are limited by indivisibility and linearity. 
Hence, there is the equivalence result and that corporate giving crowds out investors’ personal 
giving. Firms, however, should have the full range of price or quality decisions and also choice of 
contribution levels. Discussions on the benefits from altruistic business actions and the different 
ways in which firms execute them can be found in Ref. [9]. Other model features in the literature 
include, for example, the warm glow effect, which is an extra assumption that appeals to personal 
emotions of giving in addition to public consumption. Portfolio choice models assume fixed prof-
its or linear profit functions, which are not based on market foundations. It would be fruitful if 
the interlinked relationships among the public and private goods, being complementary or sub-
stitutive, can be further explored. A model that exhibits different degrees of complementarity and 
substitutability among different goods would be an alternative approach [28, 29].
3.1. External activists
A firm can expand some output to improve the environment, and such efforts toward the 
environment will be rewarded by more sales of its product. An activist may also launch a 
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boycott and threaten the firm into a settlement for more contribution toward the environment. 
This situation is studied as an extensive form game in Ref. [13]. The firm can link amount of 
giving g to per unit of output. The firm faces an inverse demand  P (q, g) , which is a function of 
quantity q and corporate giving. Corporate giving has a positive effect on the inverse demand, 
and shows up as an addition to the marginal cost MC in the profit function:
  π =  (P (q, g) − MC − g) q. (1)
In equilibrium, when the firm has a better market opportunity or the pollution level is high 
in the environment, the activist will spend more efforts and make a higher initial demand. In 
this type of model, consumer behavior is limited to one product by one firm. The multiple 
market interactions are assumed away. The part of firm value due to corporate giving is sup-
ported by the threat of boycotts.
3.2. Joint production and consumer choice
This type of models have a production technology jointly producing a public good (or allevi-
ating a public bad) along with the product, called a green product. There is a cost advantage 
for such joint production over separate production if it requires less input to produce the 
same combination of product and public good. Consumers are making purchasing decisions 
maximizing utility. A representative consumer can allocate resources endowment into a pri-
vate product or an environmental public good [14]. When the joint production of public good 
is engaged, this is called a green market. When there is a cost advantage in joint production, 
introducing the green market or improving the green technology may discourage private 
provision of public good. When the joint production is a simple bundling of the private and 
the public goods, such as direct donations with a unit of product, the equilibrium outcome is 
the same as consumer voluntary contribution without joint production.
Consumers have diverse preferences. It is realistic to consider two types of consumers: one 
type care about the public good and the other type do not [15]. Consumers have linear indi-
rect utility  V (p, g) from the product price p and public good g:
  V (p, g)  = b − p + γf (g) . (2)
The first term b is a constant,  f (g) is the utility from public good, and γ is a 0/1 indicator for 
neutral and responsible consumers, respectively. Each consumer demands only one unit of the 
product and each firm produces one unit as well. Firms have constant returns to scale technol-
ogy and constant marginal costs. Giving to public is committed with each unit of output. Firms 
compete in the market by announcing the pairs of product price and the amount of public 
good produced jointly with their products. Firms’ strategies constitute a sorting Nash equilib-
rium that separates consumer types. There are two pairs of equilibrium price and social qual-
ity indicator for two groups of consumers. Responsible firms contribute to the public good and 
charge a high price, which is the marginal cost plus a premium. Increase in corporate giving 
induces short-run profits, and the value of a firm rises while the market adjusts to equilibrium.
We can compare three modes of public good provision in this setting: corporate social respon-
sibility, private voluntary contribution, and government provision. There is a crowding out 
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effect on government provision from the other two modes. Corporation social responsibility 
will produce public goods at exactly the same level as predicted by the standard voluntary 
contribution equilibrium by individuals. Yet, corporate provision has an advantage when 
public good is naturally bundled together with the private good in production.
3.3. Oligopolistic competition and linked products
This type of models compare corporate giving in oligopolistic markets following Cournot type 
and Bertrand type of competition [16]. Firms produce identical products. In Cournot (Bertrand, 
respectively) competition, firms decide their output quantities (product prices) and leave the 
price (quantities) to be determined in the market. Firms can link a contribution to the public 
good with one unit of their products. When linked, a portion of sales is donated to a chari-
table cause. Both versions of the products, linked and unlinked, are available in the market. 
Consumers demand only one unit of product, either linked or not. They are heterogeneous in 
the willingness to pay for private and public goods. All consumers enjoy the public good, and 
there is a warm glow effect [30] associated with purchasing the linked product. They have an 
additive utility function containing nonlinked product x, linked product y, and public good g:
  U (x, y, g) . (3)
In equilibrium, two types of firms compete for socially responsible customers, and this can lead 
to overprovision of the public good. In this setting, both underprovision and overprovision of 
public good may occur. There is a tradeoff between efficient private good production and the 
efficiency of public good provision between these two modes. Namely, there is a higher level 
of public good under the Cournot competition which also has a higher product price.
3.4. Portfolio choice and managerial decision
The representative investor’s utility function contains a private good and a public good. The 
private good is produced by two firms. One of them is a socially responsible firm that pro-
duces the public good together with the private good. Investors may earn financial returns 
from shares of these two firms. The public good is composed of corporate giving from the firm 
and personal giving from investors, which also has a warm glow effect on utility. An inves-
tor has a choice of giving to charity directly or buying shares of the socially responsible firm 
and, hence, engaging in altruistic investing. This is a model of corporate giving versus direct 
giving through portfolio choice [17]. The link between firm value and its giving is explicit in 
this type of model, reflected in share price. The limitation to this approach lies in the number 
of firms and competition among firms.
Upon buying n dollar worth of shares of the socially responsible firm, γ cents per dollar of 
return will be donated to the public good. Thus, private return is  q =  (1 − γ) n . If the investor 
gives m dollars to the public directly, she consumes a public good level g, together with pri-
vate donation as warm glow. And
  g = 𝛾n + m. (4)
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The investor maximizes utility over the portfolio of shares and direct giving. When the model 
parameters satisfy a certain condition, shares of the responsible firm trade at a lower price 
than the neutral firm. When there are heterogeneous investors in the market and some strictly 
prefer corporate giving to direct giving, the responsible firm will adopt the socially respon-
sible policy of a positive amount of charitable giving in order to maximize share price.
A capital market with heterogeneous investors can be built on this model [18]. Firms have fixed 
profits and will distribute profits as financial returns. Besides two types of firms, there are also 
types of investors differentiated by a parameter θ, which indicates how strongly they feel about 
corporate giving. When corporate giving is a perfect substitute for personal giving, the former 
crowds out the latter and has no aggregate effect on the public good level. A critical level of θ sep-
arates investors into two groups. Investors with lower θ prefer personal giving and will not buy 
shares of the responsible firm, since corporate giving carries a higher cost. On the other hand, 
investors with higher θ prefer corporate giving, hence buying shares of the responsible firm.
The mechanism of managerial decision is added to this model in Refs. [31, 32]. Managerial 
contracts and personal utility induce managers to engage in socially responsible actions. The 
market value of the firm has a positive covariance with social returns. Firm’s profit func-
tion  π (e, S) is determined by managerial effort e and social expenditure S. There is a distribu-
tion of managers with differentiated ability levels, parameterized by a. Managers have utility 
function  u (I, e, S) , where I is the compensation specified by a managerial contract. The contract 
compensation  I (a, e, S) is determined by a linear function of observed profit  π and social expen-
ditures. There are two parameters in the I function that set the profit incentive and social 
incentive for managers. Managers maximize utility over two policy variables, the effort e and 
social expenditure S. Investors who own shares of a firm receive a financial return equal to 
profit minus contract compensation to the manager. Parameter θ shows how strongly inves-
tors prefer corporate giving to personal giving. It separates investors into two groups, those 
with lower θ will give personally and buy no share of the responsible firm, those with higher 
θ buy shares but will not give personally.
3.5. Monopolistic competition and industry equilibrium
Some results in the approaches discussed above may be driven by their modeling features. 
Consumers consume and firms produce indivisible products; competing firms produce 
identical products; or the public good is jointly produced with a private product at a fixed 
ratio. The equivalence result between corporate giving and personal giving comes from 
these modeling features that suppresses the roles of firms. Either they are not making 
production decisions or their actions are limited by indivisibility and linearity. Firms in 
an ideal model, however, should have the full choice range of price, quantity, and also 
contribution levels. Discussions on the benefits from altruism and the ways in which it 
is executed in corporations are provided in Ref. [9]. Other model limitations include, for 
example, that the warm glow effect is an extra assumption that appeals to personal emo-
tions of giving in addition to public consumption. Portfolio choice models assume fixed 
profits or arbitrary profit functions, which are not based on market foundations. We intro-
duce two recent approaches that incorporate a market of many firms.
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Socially responsible actions by a firm can bring customer loyalty from those who care about 
the public; this leads to less elastic demand. With a lower demand elasticity, firm’s profit is 
less sensitive to market fluctuations and provides a less risky stream of financial returns to 
investors. Thus, corporate social responsibility is a tool of risk management [19]. There are 
two types of products in the market. All products  c 
i
 are labeled on the unit interval represent-
ing variety, responsible products distribute over  i ∈  (0, μ) and regular products distribute over 
i ∈  (μ, 1) . A responsible product has a lower elasticity of substitution  σ 
r
 and a regular prod-
uct has a higher elasticity of substitution  σ 
n
 . The parameter α is the share of expenditure on 
responsible goods. Representative investor’s utility is
  C =  ( ∫ 0 μ   c i  σ r   di)  α __  σ r  +  ( ∫ μ 1   c i  σ n   di)  1−α ____ σ n   (5)
A firm can choose to invest in a production technology for a product among the continuous 
variety of products. It takes a fixed cost investing in one of these technologies. The fixed cost 
of socially responsible technology follows a distribution with a lower bound that is smaller 
than the fixed cost of the regular products. After acquiring the technology, production has 
constant returns to scale. Investors are endowed with stocks and cash. They allocate endow-
ment into consumption, stock holdings, and bonds. In period one, investment decisions are 
made and there is an aggregate consumption good which is not differentiated. It is found that 
responsible products sell at a premium to regular products. Shares of responsible firms trade 
on average higher than those of regular firms.
Another approach explores the interlinked relationships among the public and private goods, 
being complementary or substitutive. Consumer utility contains multiple private goods that 
exhibit different degrees of complementarity and substitutivity with the public good [28, 29]. 
There is no cost advantage in public good production tied with any product. The public good 
has differential effects on private products; it may be complementary to one and substitutive 
to another. For example, roads will increase the marginal utility of automobiles; this is a pub-
lic good complementary to private products. On the other hand, national defense and police 
force will decrease the marginal utility of privately owned firearms; this is a public good sub-
stitutive to private products. PBS programs will increase the marginal utility of television sets 
and at the same time decrease the marginal utility of television programs. Without assump-
tions like cost advantage in joint production or indivisibility, complementarity is enough to 
explain the endogenous demand increase caused by a public good. When there are products 
that are complementary or substitutive to the public good in various degrees, it is apparent 
that firms whose products that are more complementary to the public good will face demand 
increases with a higher public good. Thus, there are incentives to contribute to the public. 
Firms whose products that are more substitutive to the public good suffer a demand decrease 
with a higher public good level.
A model of monopolistic competition with differentiated products and a public good is pre-
sented in Ref. [20]. Individuals and firms contribute at the same time but for different reasons. 
Individuals are looking to enjoy the public good directly, while firms contribute to induce 
demand increases. Consumers and firms can choose quantities freely in the market (products 
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are not indivisible); corporate giving is a separate decision from production (do not need to 
be joint production). There is a profile of private goods  ( x 1 ,  x 2 , …) and a public good g. The price of each  x 
i
 is  p 
i
 . Consumer utility is  U ( x 1 ,  x 2 , … , g) . With wealth w and indirect utility V, the demand for a private good  x 
i







 ___ p 
i
  −   ∂ 2  V _____ ∂ w ∂ g > 0. (6)
A firm chooses quantity as strategy, find corresponding prices on the demand curve, and then 
announce prices in the market. This is an approach advocated by Refs. [33, 34]. By analyzing 
the derivative of the profit function with respect to g, we found a cutoff point for the cross par-








 increases more strongly with the pub-





with the public good. The equilibrium condition for corporate social responsibility and that 
for voluntary contribution are independent, and hence they are not perfect substitutes. More 




 will increase demand and its 
value. In this setting, giving is a strategic market decision under competition with other firms.
4. Practice
In practice, companies engage in responsible activities for a few main reasons. First, the tax 
code provides incentives for companies to make charitable contributions as doing so lowers 
their taxable income. The highest US corporate tax rate is 35% and when combined with state 
and local taxes, the actual corporate tax rate is closer to 39%. Hence, for every $1 contributed to 
charitable causes, the company can save about 39 cents in lower tax payments. Second, mak-
ing charitable contributions improves the corporate image. In addition, these contributions 
support the communities in which their employees live making the community a better place 
to live. Corporate giving garners respect from the employees. Third, these contributions sup-
port the communities in which their employees live making the community a better place to 
live. Fourth, corporate giving garners respect from the employees. Klara Kozlov, head of cor-
porate clients at the Charities Aid Foundation cites companies desire to “do good” as motiva-
tion for corporate gifts. Moreover, these contributions also serve to increase the popularity of 
the business which may increase consumer loyalty to the company. Fifth, companies involved 
with social corporate philanthropy receive media exposure and positive public attention/rec-
ognition. Hence providing the company with valuable advertising and marketing.
There are numerous examples of companies who are involved in corporate social responsibil-
ity. We provide some examples here, highlighting some of the companies that have recently 
been recognized for their generosity. In the United States, the Motley Fool in 2017 ranked the 
12 most charitable US companies with health care, bank, and technology companies leading 
the list [35]. While there were two notable exceptions in Exxon and Walmart on the leading 
charitable company list, the remaining companies were comprised of health care, banking, 
and technology. The key component that drives corporate donations is company profitability. 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Value: Recent Developments
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.76160
107
Companies that are not profitable or are losing money do not have money to give away for 
public goods. The US companies which dominate the most charitable list of Motley Fool share 
a common attribute - there are considerable barriers to entry, for example, the pharmaceutical 
companies on the list are Pfizer, Gilead, Merck, Bristol Myers Squibb, and Eli Lily, all have 
block buster drug patents that generate millions in profits for the companies. These health 
care companies may be trying to change the narrative when it comes to negative media atten-
tion about outlandish drug prices. For example, President Donald Trump tweeted on March 
7, 2017: “I am working on a new system where there will be competition in the drug industry. 
Pricing for the American people will come way down!” [36].
In the technology industry, Alphabet (parent company of Google), Microsoft, and Cisco also 
appear on the Motley Fool’s 12 most charitable US companies list. These high-technology 
companies are highly profitable and due to their market dominant position they possess, mar-
ket power. Moreover, their leading position creates a significant barrier to entry for competi-
tors. What is driving these companies to make charitable contributions? One research study 
found that people received greater happiness from giving away money to others rather than 
spending money on themselves [37]. In corporate giving, Alphabet has taken this approach 
in its corporate gifts as it has provided money to its clients to donate to charity, where the 
client chooses who receives the donation via the nonprofit web site. Such actions by Alphabet 
promote Google’s mantra of “don’t be evil” while earning loyalty and respect of its employees 
and clients.
Financial companies Goldman Sachs and Wells Fargo appear on the charitable list as well. It 
is ironic that Wells Fargo appears on the most charitable list, given since 2009 to 2015 Wells 
Fargo created 3.5 fake bank and credit card accounts. In an effort to re-gain consumer and 
public trust Wells Fargo may feel compelled to continue to make charitable contributions in 
an attempt to change the perception of Wells Fargo. The financial industry also has significant 
barriers to entry with the market structure being monopolistically competitive. Charitable 
contributions by financial institutions are not limited to the United States, since in the United 
Kingdom the industry sector with the largest average cash and in-kind gifts occurs in the 
finance industry [38].
One of the most competitive industries in the United States is the airline industry. Since 
September 11, 2001 there have been 12 chapter 7 filings (company closes) and 29 chapter 11 fil-
ings (re-organization). Of the four largest US carriers today, three of them (American Airlines, 
United Airlines, and Delta Airlines) were at some point in Chapter 11 bankruptcy since 2001. 
The remaining exception is Southwest Airlines which has never declared bankruptcy. Hence, 
we should expect to find larger charitable contributions for Southwest Airlines compared to 
its peers. In 2017, Southwest Airlines provided nearly 39,000 free flights for a combined value 
of more than $19 million in total charitable gifts [39]. In 2016, American Airlines provided 
$23.5 million in total charitable giving [40].
Next, we examine reasons beyond profitability to explain corporate social responsibility. 
Some businesses may choose to make charitable contributions in lieu of advertising/market-
ing expenditures as these businesses may see the chance for possible public recognition as 
“free” advertising and marketing. For example, Texas Roadhouse operates in such a fashion 
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as explained by David Hollinger (Managing Partner of Texas Roadhouse in Greenville, NC) 
since Texas Roadhouse views making charitable contributions to non-profit organizations 
as a “part of the fabric of the community. In return, we hope that people choose to eat at our 
restaurant” (interview with author January 11, 2018).
Additional evidence that corporations make charitable contributions as a form of advertis-
ing comes from outside the restaurant industry. Consider Allstate Insurance company which 
makes a contribution to the universities general scholarship fund for each field goal that lands 
in a net with the Good Hands logo of Allstate. There are 90 college and university stadiums 
as well as championship and bowl game events that carry the Good Hands logo. Moreover, 
the television broadcasters also mention the contribution that Allstate is making to the schol-
arship fund. Clearly, Allstate is receiving “free” advertising for these contributions. Upon 
further examination of the Allstate contributions to the Good Hands Field Goal Net Program 
for the 10-year period 2005–2014, it has been found that Allstate contributed $3.4 million to 
scholarships or about $340,000 per year in scholarships [41]. Given that 90 universities carry 
the Good Hands logo on their nets, this translates to about $3778 per school per year which 
would cover about 50% of one semester tuition and fees for an instate resident to attend the 
University of Michigan. Given that the cost of a 30-section television ad on ESPN during the 
National Championship game in 2016 is $1 million [42], it is no wonder that Allstate has cho-
sen the “free” advertising of the Good Hands Field Goal Net Program.
5. Conclusion
Companies may feel compelled to undertake socially responsible actions for a variety of 
reasons including to lower their taxable earnings, to become a fabric of the community, to 
encourage consumer loyalty, foster employee pride/satisfaction, and to receive “free” adver-
tising/publicity. Companies that are more inclined to make charitable contributions may also 
have more profits to share with the community. Moreover, the most charitable companies in 
the USA possess the characteristics of being both highly profitable and these companies have 
a market dominant position in their industry, which may explain why high technology, big 
pharmaceutical companies, and large financial institutions predominantly comprise the most 
charitable companies in the United States. There is overwhelming evidence provided on both 
continents that firms which engage in corporate social responsibility have higher firm valu-
ations. At the heart of these companies that voluntarily choose to go above and beyond by 
making contributions to society is the creation of trust. This trust encourages loyalty among 
consumers and loyalty among employees. When financial difficulty does arise, this loyalty 
that companies have accrued through being good corporate citizens gets repaid in terms of 
better stock market performance during the financial crisis.
Empirical studies confirm the positive impact of corporate social responsibility on firm value. 
Yet, there are different types of socially responsible actions, such as environmental and social 
compliance, donation to charitable causes, and public good linked products. Their impacts may 
realize in investors’ expectation of a better company perspective or in consumer’s preferences 
bringing in a higher product demand. Future research may aim to identify and distinguish the 
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quantitative effects from different responsible actions and different channels. Theoretical mod-
els study in various market situations, how corporate social responsibility affect firms’ value 
and competition. In the market, a firm’s decision to contribute to the public is influenced by the 
interactions among consumers, investors, managers, and activists. The firm contributes to the 
public good through joint production of monetary giving. Firms compete in market structures 
of different degrees of competitiveness. Socially responsible actions can increase firm value via 
demand increases. These demand increases are usually exogenously assumed without a mar-
ket foundation. Recent approaches embed demand increase in the competition among firms in 
the full market of industry equilibrium. Corporate giving is endogenized as one among other 
market strategies of firms, like price and output quantity. This research direction is fruitful and 
there is a need for empirically testable models. In a competitive market, perfectly or imper-
fectly, we can examine and test the substitutability of corporate social responsibility for other 
market strategies. For example, spending on corporate giving may crowed out investment, 
advertisement, and product development. We also need a well-defined welfare comparison 
for the effects of increased public good and efficiency loss in the market. This is a growing area 
that bridges business strategy and the provision of public good.
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